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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
The intellectual property area in the Tenth Circuit was relatively quiet
during 1994 with only one trademark case surfacing. In Universal Money
Centers., Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,' the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the Kansas district court's grant of summary judgment to American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"), concluding as a matter of law that
AT&T's use of the word "Universal" was unlikely to cause confusion among
consumers.2 In doing so, the court approved the application of the "likelihood
of confusion" test3 and clarified its position regarding two factors of the test:
similarity of services and degree of care exercised by consumers.4 More im-
portantly, the court endorsed the addition of another component, "strength of
the mark," to the "likelihood of confusion" test.'
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Universal Money, while not surprising,
demonstrates its understanding of trademark rights. The court set forth a clear
framework for district courts to follow in trademark infringement disputes by
systematically analyzing each factor of importance in the "likelihood of confu-
sion" test and balancing the evidence accordingly.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fundamentals of Trademark Law
The most important intellectual property asset owned by a business is its
trademark. A trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device"
used by any person "to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods
even if that source is unknown."7 Thus, trademarks promote various functions.
They identify the good's origin, guarantee quality consistency, and serve as an
advertising device!
1. 22 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 1536.
3. Id. at 1530; see Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir.
1986) (articulating the application of the likelihood of confusion test) [hereinafter Beer Nuts i];
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940-41 (1983), rev'd, 805 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating the criteria for the likelihood of confusion test) [hereinafter Beer Nuts I].
4. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33.
5. Id. at 1533 (noting that "strength of the mark" was not specifically listed as a relevant
factor in Beer Nuts I).
6. ROBERT C. DoRR & CHRIsToPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 124 (1990) (noting that simply mentioning certain trademarks
such as Edsel, McDonald's or Exxon elicits either a favorable or unfavorable reaction).
7. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. See EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETI-
TIVE PROCESS 246 (rev. 4th ed. 1991); see also Educational Dev. Corp. v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Trademark law, however, is concerned with more than protection of the
trademark owner. In fact, to address additional concerns, such as shielding the
consumer from confusion over the source and identity of products,9 Congress
enacted the Lanham Act.'" Of specific interest are §§ 1 14(1)(a) and 1125(a)
of the Act. Section 1114(a) relates to trademark infringement by one who uses
a registered mark which is likely to cause confusion." Section 1125(a) is
concerned with marks that indicate false designations of origin and are likely
to cause confusion. Therefore, the unauthorized marketplace use of a regis-
tered mark that is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the product
establishes an action for trademark infringement. 3
B. Likelihood of Confusion Test
The touchstone for trademark infringement is "likelihood of confusion."' 4
As previously noted, the Lanham Act requires that defendant's use of the
mark be "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 5
Various market factors are set out in the RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION to identify proof of likelihood of confusion. 6 The elements considered
include the degree of resemblance between the marks, the similarity of mar-
26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977) (defining a trademark as a "distinctive mark, symbol, or emblem used by
a producer of manufacturer to identify and distinguish his goods from those of others"); Jacqueline
Stem, Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 666
(1983).
9. See KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 8, at 247; see also McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. Amer-
ican Aviation Assocs., 117 F.2d 293, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (noting that the purpose of trademark
law is "to safeguard the consumer by helping him get what he thinks he wants").
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1l14(l)(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides that the unauthorized use of
"any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988) states:
Any person who ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device.., or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact ... which ... is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake ... as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.., shall
be liable.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a); see Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484
(10th Cit. 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc. 809 F.2d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1987); Beer
Nuts 1H, 805 F.2d at 924.
14. See, e.g., Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993); Americana Trading
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992); DeCosta v. Viacom Int'l.,
Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 605-06 (1st Cir. 1992); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978
F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992); Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1991); Beer Nuts 1H, 805 F.2d at 925; Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983); DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148 (noting that the test
is also utilized by the Patent Trademark Office (PTO) to determine whether to approve a trade-
mark application).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1993) ("Whether an actor's use
of a designation causes a likelihood of confusion with the use of a trademark ... by another...
is determined by a consideration of all the circumstances involved in the marketing of the respec-
tive goods .... ).
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keting techniques of the two parties, the characteristics of the prospective
consumers and the degree of care exercised in making purchasing decisions,
the degree of distinctiveness of the mark, and the product and geographic
markets in which the competing marks are used. 7
A majority of courts utilize a variation 8 of the "sight, sound and mean-
ing" test set out in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.'9 The Tenth Circuit en-
dorsed the Restatement of Torts approach by laying out the relevant factors to
consider in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.2" Beer Nuts 11 involved
a trademark infringement action over the registered and incontestable trade-
mark name "BEER NUTS" owned by Beer Nuts, Inc." Clover Club sold the
same product, sweetened, salted peanuts, under the name "BREW NUTS.
'22
Beer Nuts sued Clover Club in an action for trademark infringement. The
District Court ruled that there was no likelihood of confusion concerning the
origin of the competing products.23 The Tenth Circuit repeated the factors to
consider for the "likelihood of confusion" test.24
The court cautioned that the list was not exhaustive, nor was one factor
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Nikon, 987 F.2d at 94 (listing eight factors: strength of the mark, the similarity
between the two marks, the similarity between the products, the likelihood that the senior user will
overlap with the junior user, the sophistication of buyers, quality of defendant's product, actual
confusion, and the defendant's bad faith in adopting the mark); DeCosta, 981 F.2d at 606 (listing
eight factors: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and services, relation of the "chan-
nels" which parties trade through, similarity of advertising, types of prospective buyers, actual
confusion, junior user's reason for using mark, and strength of the mark); Americana Trading, 966
F.2d at 1287 (listing six factors: strength of the mark, similarity in appearance, sound, and mean-
ing, class of goods in question, marketing channels used, actual confusion, and intent of the junior
user); In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (listing thir-
teen factors: similarity of appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, similarity of
goods, similarity of trade channels, conditions under which purchase is likely to be made, fame of
the mark, number of similar marks, actual confusion, length of time concurrent use of the mark
has created confusion, variety of goods on which a mark is used, market interface between junior
and senior user, extent to which the junior user could exclude others from using mark, extent of
potential confusion, and any other probative fact).
19. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938) outlines the following criteria:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trademark or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services marketed
by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
20. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940 (stating that to determine whether likelihood of confusion
exists, the "court has used the criteria set out in the Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938)"). The
Tenth Circuit confronted the likelihood of confusion issue first in Beer Nuts I. After laying out the
relevant criteria to be analyzed, the case was remanded to make a determination. However, the
Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit Beer Nuts I when the case was once again appealed to
review the district court's determination that it was unlikely that confusion would exist between
the two marks. Beer Nuts 1I, 805 F.2d at 925 (reiterating the Restatement of Torts factors set forth
in Beer Nuts 1).
21. Beer Nuts 1I, 805 F.2d at 922.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 925. For a list of the factors, see supra note 19.
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determinative." After applying the factors, the Tenth Circuit held that both
trademarks, "BEER NUTS" and "BREW NUTS," identified the source of the
products.26 However, because of the similarity between the marks and
products, there was a likelihood of confusion. Thus, the court concluded that
Clover Club's use of "BREW NUTS" constituted infringement of the "BEER
NUTS" trademark."
7
1. Similarity of the Marks
The similarity of marks should be tested according to the three levels
encountered in the marketplace: sight, sound, and meaning." Four relevant
factors to consider when evaluating "similarity" are the marks' appearance,
pronunciation of the words used, verbal translation of the designs used, and
suggestion or meaning.29 A "side-by-side" comparison, however, should not
be made.' Instead, the court must ascertain whether the public will be con-
fused when individually presented with the infringing mark.3 Moreover,
when balancing the factors, the similarities between the marks should be
weighed more'heavily than the difference.32
a. Similarity of Appearance
The first subtest of similarity of the marks relies solely on the comparison
of the visual appearance of the marks.33 When analyzing the similarity of
designs, the overall impression created by the mark is most important, not the
dissection and comparison of individual features.34 For example, the visual
appearance of a gold horse's head compared with that of a large brightly col-
ored pig head with two hooves was strikingly dissimilar.35 On the other hand,
there was similarity in the designs of EXXON and Texon since both utilized
red block letters on a white background with a blue bar underlining EXXON
and with an address in blue letters beneath Texon.36
25. Beer Nuts I1, 805 F.2d at 925.
26. Id. at 928.
27. Id.
28. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940; see Americana Trading Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966
F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. See Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940; see also Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (10th Cir. 1987) (listing the four factors and stating that "[tlrademarks may be
confusingly similar if they suggest the same idea or meaning").
30. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 940.
33. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148.
34. See Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1979); see
also Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(stating that the dominant portion of a mark justifiably has greater weight in evaluating the likeli-
hood of confusion but the mark must be considered as a whole).
35. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (noting that the striking dissimilarities in the designs used
greatly outweighed any similarities).
36. Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 72:3
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b. Similarity of Pronunciation
The second subtest relies upon phonetic similarity.37 Again, courts em-
phasize that the similarity is based upon the total impression and not on indi-
vidual similar features.3" Thus, while the marks "Alpha" and "Alpa" were
found to be closely related in appearance and sound, other factors mitigated
the total effect.39 However, the marks "BREW NUTS" and "BEER NUTS,"
although clearly different, were found to have "phonetic and semantic similari-
ties" which outweighed other differences.'
c. Verbal Translation of the Designs
The third subtest involves the translation of the design. If the translation
suggests the same meaning as the opposing mark, then the trademarks may be
confusingly similar.4' Therefore, when the term "BREW NUTS" was com-
bined with a stein of an overflowing head of foam, there was no other reason-
able translation of the design except that it was meant to be beer.42
d. Similarity of Meaning or Suggestion
The final subtest is the similarity of the meaning of the marks. For exam-
ple, the word "brew" is a synonym for "beer" and was found to convey the
same meaning.43 A contrary result, however, was found for the terms "Dawn"
and "Daylight.""
2. Intent of the Actor
The Tenth Circuit, in Beer Nuts I!, noted that when a junior user deliber-
ately adopts a similar mark, this implies an "inference of intent" that the junior
user is trying to pass his goods off as those of the senior user.45 However,
knowledge of the existence of the mark, without more, is insufficient to fore-
close further inquiry.' Thus, the focal point for the issue of intent is whether
a benefit is derived from the reputation of the plaintiff.47
37. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148.
38. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (5th
Cir. 1981).
39. Id. (noting that similar marks are less likely to be confusing when used in conjunction
with clearly displayed names or logos); see Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (acknowledging the pho-
netic similarity of "Jordache" and "Lardashe" but finding striking dissimilarities in the overall
design).
40. Beer Nuts II, 805 F.2d at 926 (noting that "brew" and "beer" are both "one syllable
words having four letters three of which are the same, and they both begin with the same letter").
41. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485.
42. Beer Nuts I1, 805 F.2d at 926.
43. Id. (stating that "brew" could not "reasonably be taken to mean coffee or tea or bever-
ages in general; it can only be understood to mean beer").
44. Dawn Donut Co. v. Day, 450 F.2d 332, 333 (10th Cir. 1971) (defining "Dawn" as "the
first appearance of light at morning" and "Daylight" as including "all of the period when the sun
is shining on a particular area of the earth").
45. Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 927.
46. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998
(1990).
47. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485; see Americana Trading Inc., 966 F.2d at 1289 (stating that
1995]
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3. Similarity of Services and Manner of Marketing Services
a. Similarity of Services
An additional factor to consider is whether likelihood of confusion exists
in the similarity of the products or services provided by the plaintiff and the
defendant.' "The greater the similarity between the products and services,
the greater the likelihood of confusion."'49
b. Similarity in Manner of Marketing Services
The method of advertising is another relevant factor to consider.0 If the
products are marketed similarly, it increases the possibility of confusion.5
4. Degree of Care
The fourth element to analyze is the degree to which the consumers are
likely to be careful buyers of the product.52 In consideration of this factor, the
cost and nature of the product are helpful in determining if purchasers would
impulsively buy the item or if the price was such that it would require more
deliberation.53 The sophistication of the purchaser should also be considered
in determining the degree of care which would be exercised. 4
C. Additional Factors
1. Actual Confusion
Actual confusion within the marketplace provides the best evidence of the
"[a] latecomer who adopts a mark with intent to capitalize upon a market previously developed by
competitors in the field must at least prove that his effort has been futile"); Sicilia Di R. Biebow
& Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 431 (5th Cir. 1984).
48. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T, 797 F. Supp. 891, 894 (D. Kan. 1992).
49. Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505.
50. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532.
51. Id.; see Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 895; Beer Nuts IH, 805 F.2d at 926; Victory
Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 558 (N.D. 111. 1984).
52. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992);
Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487; Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940-41.
53. Coherent Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991)
(noting that Coherent's customers are likely to be careful buyers because the products are expen-
sive); Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 926-27 (stating that items purchased impulsively are generally not
on one's shopping list and thus, little degree of care is exercised when purchasing the item); Beer
Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941 ("[B]uyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive
items that may be purchased on impulse. Despite a lower degree of similarity, these items are
more likely to be confused than expensive items which are chosen carefully."); Omaha Nat'l Bank
v. Citibank, 633 F. Supp. 231, 235-36 (D. Neb. 1986) (holding that customers who select between
ATM card providers are likely to exercise a relatively high degree of care).
54. Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1125 (noting that "Coherent's customers are likely to be careful
buyers for several reasons: They are sophisticated persons, such as engineers, project managers
and corporate officers .... ); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 662 (10th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he public is not so naive as to believe that any business that employs a
rainbow as part of its name is affiliated with Rainbo Oil"); Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91,
95 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting "[t]he more sophisticated and careful the average consumer of a prod-
uct is, the less likely it is that similarities . . . will result in confusion concerning the source or
sponsorship of the product").
[Vol. 72:3
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likelihood of confusion.55 The absence of evidence indicating confusion, how-
ever, will not necessarily support a finding that it is unlikely that confusion
will exist. 6 Indications of confusion among consumers can be determined by
using a survey, 7 but the survey must measure marketplace confusion.58 Ad-
ditionally, actual confusion may be demonstrated by evidence of consumer in-
quiries to the plaintiff as to affiliation of the alleged infringing product. How-
ever, this evidence will not be weighed heavily.59
2. Likelihood of Expansion of Product Lines
In Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., the District Court of
Colorado added to its analysis the likelihood of expansion of product lines.'
The Tenth Circuit did not directly comment on this element. The court merely
noted that review of the lower court's record confirmed the overall findings.6
Thus, one could infer that this factor could be considered along with the likeli-
hood of confusion test.
3. Strength of the Mark
The District Court of Utah, in Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc.,
considered the strength of the plaintiff's mark as a factor.62 Again, the Tenth
Circuit chose not to comment upon the addition of another element to the
likelihood of confusion test. Instead, the court noted that the findings were not
clearly erroneous.63 The court preferred to rely upon the substantial evidence
of the district court's findings that related to the factors outlined in Beer Nuts
11.' Consequently, it was unclear whether "strength of the mark" was a via-
ble factor to consider.
However, in Universal Money, the Tenth Circuit endorsed the use of
"strength of the mark" as an additional element and clarified its meaning of
55. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487; see Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74
(10th Cir. 1958) (holding that "[t]here can be no more positive proof of likelihood of confusion
than evidence of actual confusion").
56. See, e.g., Beer Nuts ii, 805 F.2d at 927 (noting that consumers are unlikely to bother
informing the plaintiff that they are confused); Nikon, 987 F.2d at 95.
57. See, e.g., Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1126 (noting that surveys may be used to show actual
confusion); Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487 (finding that "the evidentiary value of such surveys de-
pends on the relevance of the questions asked and the technical adequacy of the survey proce-
dures."); Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 75 (stating that the results of a survey may be received as
evidence to establish the existence of confusion).
58. Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1126 (holding that "[blecause Coherent's survey did not measure
marketplace confusion, neither of these cases indicates it should be given more weight").
59. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487 (holding that customer inquiry evidence is admissible, but
even when combined with other evidence it is of comparatively little value).
60. 736 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (D. Colo. 1990).
61. 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that Coherent did not intend to expand
into defendant's product line, nor did Coherent Technology intend to expand into the plaintiff's).
62. 809 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir. 1987).
63. Id.
64. id. (noting that there was ample evidence of the dissimilarities between the two marks,
lack of intent to create confusion, different marketing techniques, and the degree of care likely to
be exercised by consumers).
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similarity of services and degree of care."
II. THE UNIVERSAL MONEY 1166 DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Universal Money Centers, Inc. ("UMC"), a Missouri Corporation, owns
the following registered trademarks: "UNIVERSAL MONEY CARD," "UNI-
VERSAL MONEY CENTER," "UNIVERSAL MONEY" and design, and
"UNIVERSAL MONEY."7 UMC provides electronic banking services and
contracts with various financial institutions to provide plastic "debit" cards for
its customers. The cards bear one of the UMC trademarks and are used for
accessing automatic teller machines ("ATMs") and for retail purchases at
selected stores.'
AT&T introduced the "AT&T Universal Card," a combination telephone
and retail card, on March 26, 1990. In the following twelve months, AT&T
spent over $60 million in advertising to promote its card.' The AT&T Uni-
versal Card is affiliated with Visa and MasterCard and may be used at retail
stores, to place telephone calls, and to withdraw from ATMs displaying the
"Plus" or "VISA" logos.
70
UMC filed an action in the District of Kansas alleging trademark infringe-
ment and sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin AT&T from using
the term "Universal. 71
B. District Court Holding
On August 30, 1990, the district court denied UMC's motion for a prelim-
inary injunction.72 Two years later, on June 16, 1992, the court granted
AT&T's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that the
concurrent use of the word "Universal" was not likely to cause confusion as to
the origin of the two products.73
The district court adhered to the Beer Nuts 11 test for likelihood of
65. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33.
66. Id. at 1527.
67. Id. at 1528 (noting that the terms "MONEY," "MONEY CARD," and "MONEY CEN-
TER" were disclaimed from the trademark).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1528-29. However, the AT&T Universal Card cannot be used at UMC ATMs since
AT&T and UMC are not affiliated. Id. at 1529.
71. Id. at 1529. UMC employees were alerted to AT&T's use of the word "Universal" on
March 26, 1990 when AT&T began their advertising campaign. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The district court acknowledged that "likelihood of confusion is a question of fact,
[however], 'summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute about the facts
material to the [likelihood of confusion] analysis, and those facts could lead to only one reason-
able conclusion."' Universal Money 1, 797 F. Supp. at 893 (citation omitted) (quoting Lang v. Re-




confusion."4 The court found that the degree of similarity between the marks
was minimal and that there was little chance of consumer confusion. 5 Like-
wise, there was no indication that AT&T intentionally selected "Universal" in
order to "pass off its goods as the product of another."76 While acknowledg-
ing that there were similarities in the services of the products, the primary pur-
pose of the cards was different." The court also found that the UMC card
and the AT&T card were marketed through different channels." Furthermore,
the purchasers of debit cards were found to exercise at least a moderate degree
of care in selecting a particular card.79 Thus, the consumer would be con-
scious of the services provided by the card and also the source of the card.0
In support of its decision, the court noted that there was an insignificant
amount of actual consumer confusion over the origin of the cards."' Finally,
the term "Universal" was regarded as a weak trademark since it is frequently
used by businesses. 2 UMC appealed from the district court's finding of lack
of confusion.
C. The Tenth Circuit Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit began with a reminder that the burden of proof is on
UMC to demonstrate that the concurrent use of the term "Universal" by
AT&T was likely to cause consumer confusion over the source of the prod-
ucts." The court repeated the factors to consider in determining likelihood of
confusion between two marks. 4 However, it cautioned that since the factors
are interwoven, the "list is not exhaustive" and "no one factor is disposi-
tive."85
74. Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 893.
75. Id. at 894. Specifically, the court noted that (1) even though both AT&T and UMC use
the word "Universal," the "dominant portion" of the competing marks was dissimilar; (2) "the
marks have different sounds and cadences;" (3) the overall design of the two cards (lettering
styles, logos, and color schemes) were significantly different; and (4) the two marks, in the court's
view, failed to communicate "the same idea or stimulate the same mental reaction." Id.
76. Id. (quoting Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941). The court noted that instead AT&T chose the
term because of its meaning and because of the favorable response of AT&T's customers. Id.
77. Id. at 895 (finding that the primary purpose of the UMC card was for ATM use com-
pared to the primary purpose of the AT&T card was to purchase items on credit).
78. Id. at 895-96 (stating that AT&T markets its card directly to the public through media
sources compared to UMC which markets indirectly to the public through financial institutions).
79. Id. at 896.
80. Id. (noting that a card such as UMC's and AT&T's was unlikely to be purchased impul-
sively since it could only be obtained by exercising a certain degree of effort).
81. Id. at 896-97 (noting that AT&T offered survey results, consumer affidavits and deposi-
tions to show the lack of actual confusion, whereas UMC had "offered little but allegations and
denials").
82. Id. at 897 (pointing out that there are over 200 businesses which use the term "Univer-
sal").
83. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1530 (stating that it was irrelevant that UMC's registered
trademark had become incontestable. "The party alleging infringement has the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion.") (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484).
84. Id. For a list of the factors, see supra note 19.
85. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1530 (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484).
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1. Similarity of the Marks
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that there
was a minimal degree of similarity between UMC's and AT&T's marks. 6
The two marks were strikingly dissimilar in their appearance, thus confusion
would not occur even when they were "singly presented.""7 Also, the two
marks did not sound the same - "Universal Money" versus "AT&T Universal
Card."88 Furthermore, the two marks did not even "convey the same idea or
stimulate the same mental reaction." 9 Therefore, any similarities between the
marks were greatly outweighed by the differences.'
2. Intent of the Actor
The court concurred with the district court that the evidence did not reveal
any intent on the part of AT&T to copy UMC's mark.9 It was not enough to
show that AT&T knew about UMC's registered trademark.92 Instead, the in-
quiry focused on whether AT&T was trying to acquire an advantage "from the
reputation or goodwill" of UMC.93 Since no evidence pointed to this, AT&T
lacked the requisite intent.94
3. Similarity of Services & Manner of Marketing Services
a. Similarity of Services
The Tenth Circuit regarded the district court's analysis of this factor as
"overly technical." '9 The services provided by AT&T and UMC cards were
similar; however, since the marks themselves were "strikingly dissimilar," it
carried little weight."
b. Similarity in Manner of Marketing Services
The court held that it was unlikely that consumers would be confused due
to the differing methods of advertising engaged by AT&T and UMC.97 More-
over, the fact that the cards were distributed in the same manner could not "be
86. Id. at 1531.
87. Id. The court remarked on the differences in the overall design of the two cards. Id.
UMC always combined "Universal" with the term "Money." On the other hand, AT&T combined
"Universal" with the AT&T mark but never with "Money." Id. Also, the AT&T card had a Visa




91. Id. at 1532.
92. Id. "Mere knowledge [of a similar mark] should not foreclose further inquiry." Id. (quot-
ing GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990)).
93. Id. (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (acknowledging that similarity of services weighed in UMC's favor).
97. Id. (comparing the methods of advertising: AT&T promotes their card directly to the
public; UMC does not).
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said to create confusion." 8
4. Degree of Care
The court agreed with UMC that the degree of care exercised by consum-
ers should be measured at the time they used their cards." This contrasted
with the district court's inquiry into the degree of care that consumers exer-
cised when selecting a provider of ATM cards."° The court refused, how-
ever, to find that AT&T cardholders' attempts to use UMC ATMs were a
result of any similarities between the marks."' Instead, the court noted that it
was common to confuse any ATM card with other ATM cards or ma-
chines." 2
5. Strength of Mark
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the district court's consideration of the
strength or weakness of UMC's marks.' 3 Since the term "Universal" is
"widely used" by other business entities, it is a "relatively weak mark."" °
6. Actual Confusion
The court found that despite some evidence of actual confusion, it was not
sufficient to warrant a finding of likelihood of confusion. The small
amount of evidence supporting likelihood of confusion was undermined by the
"sheer lack of similarity between the marks.""'°
D. The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the weight of authority given to AT&T's sur-
vey results, which indicated a small amount of actual confusion. 7 UMC had
presented sufficient evidence of four hundred AT&T cardholders who had
attempted to use an UMC ATM.' The dissent also indicated that the testi-
98. Id. at 1532-33.
99. Id. at 1533 (noting that "the purpose of the inquiry is to determine the degree of care




103. Id. (noting that it was not a specific factor listed in the Beer Nuts 1H test).
104. Id. at 1533-34. "A strong trademark is one that is rarely used by parties other than the
owner of the trademark, while a weak trademark is one that is often used by other parties." Id. at
1533 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 626 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir.
1980)).
105. Id. at 1535 (noting that "isolated instances of actual confusion [were] de minimis").
106. Id. at 1535-36 (concluding that AT&T submitted "substantial" and "reliable" evidence to
rebut the inference of likelihood of confusion).
107. Id. at 1538 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (pointing out that UMC's evidence raised a material
issue of fact of the validity of AT&T's survey results).
108. Id. (describing the AT&T card as displaying "Universal" in the upper right comer, the
AT&T logo in the upper left comer, and the Visa logo in the lower right comer). The dissent
regarded this evidence as sufficient proof that an AT&T cardholder would presume that both
Universal and Visa sponsored the card. Id. at 1539. Moreover, actual confusion was found by
AT&T's own expert. Id.
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mony and affidavits submitted by UMC employees should have been given
more credence." When conflicting evidence is submitted, according to the
dissent, it is for the jury to determine the truth of the matter. "'
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Tenth Circuit did not make any extraordinary findings in
Universal Money, the opinion was helpful because it clarified certain factors
and also gave insight into what criteria should be considered within the
subtests of likelihood of confusion. Hopefully, the decision will provide better
.guidelines for those who engage in trademark clearance searches.
For example, in the court's discussion of the degree of similarity in ap-
pearance of the two marks, the court specifically contrasted the lettering styles,
logos and coloring schemes."' Also of importance was the combination of
the term "Universal" with other words."2 Thus, if the term was coupled with
other logos or marks, then confusion would be unlikely." 3 Even though the
terms "Money," "Money Center," and "Money Card" were disclaimed as
descriptive of services, the terms still must be considered in the likelihood of
confusion determination." 4 UMC argued that it was for the jury to determine
if AT&T's card was confusingly similar to that of UMC's since the term
"Universal" was set off from the accompanying AT&T logo."5 However, the
court dismissed UMC's contentions since "the distinctive AT&T house mark
[was] prominently displayed on the front of AT&T's card."" 6
Other helpful guidelines were provided by the court in its analysis of
AT&T's intent in adopting the term "Universal." Special attention was focused
on the amount of money that was expended on promotional activities,' how
109. Id. at 1539 (giving weight to a phone survey of 64 AT&T cardholders and the testimony
of UMC's Senior Vice-President stating actual confusion).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1531; see Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (noting that the word "Jordache" was written
in either white block letters or blue block letters and sometimes was in script. Whereas,
"Lardashe" was written in script accompanied by additional marks); Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 926
(commenting that both logos "brew" and "beer" have one syllable, four letters, and begin with the
same letter); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting that the "dominant portion" of both logos is the term "Giant" within a circular or oval-
shaped object with the letters "G" and "T" partially outside the circular portion of the designs);
Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505 (noting that both marks utilized red, block letters on a white background
with either blue lettering underneath or a blue bar).
112. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531.
113. See id.; see, e.g., Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (stating that "in certain circumstances oth-
erwise similar marks are not likely to be confused where used in conjunction with the clearly
displayed name and/or logo of the manufacturer").
114. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531. The court refused to focus solely on the term "Uni-




117. Id. at 1532 (pointing out that AT&T spent more than $60 million on promotional servic-
es, thereby allowing the inference that AT&T was "relying on its own publicity and reputation");
see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (noting that the defendant had spent nearly $10 million on publicity, promotion and other
related activities), affd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the term "Universal" was selected,"' and the diligence of trademark counsel
in searching for interference of the word "Universal.""' 9 While not pertinent
in this case, an additional factor examined in Beer Nuts II was the existence of
a prior relationship between the two parties. 20 Mere knowledge of the exis-
tence of a term is not enough; rather, the focus is whether a benefit was de-
rived from the plaintiff. 2'
With regard to similarity of services, the court criticized the district
court's approach as being "overly technical for the purposes of 'likelihood of
confusion. " "" The district court engaged in a dissection of the services of
the two products and found that UMC cards were primarily used at ATMs,
while AT&T cards were credit cards used for long-distance telephone calls
and retail purchases.'23 The Tenth Circuit suggested a more general approach
should be taken for comparison of services and that it was not necessary to
engage in contrasting technical differences such as manner of operation and
purpose. 24 Similarities in products or services will carry little weight if the
marks are strikingly dissimilar.'25
As for the similarity in manner of marketing services, the court focused
on the amount of money spent on advertising'26 and the means used for
product promotion.'27 Even though the card distribution process through the
mail to the customers was identical for both UMC and AT&T, AT&T's pro-
cess was not regarded as "promotional."' 28 Thus, they were dissimilar in
118. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531 (noting that the selection process taken by AT&T in-
volved consumer reaction studies and a "name game" whereby employees suggested the term); cf.
Proctor & Gamble, 485 F. Supp. at 1201 (noting that name selection resulted from "extensive
lengthy consumer testing and research during which hundreds of names were considered and many
were tested").
119. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531-32. Approximately 200 registered marks were found
to include the term "Universal," including UMC's. Their marks were analyzed for likelihood of
confusion, but counsel determined that confusion was unlikely. However, AT&T was cautioned
that the use of the word "posed a risk" because of its popularity and because AT&T was "vulnera-
ble to complaints of infringement because we are AT&T." Id.
120. Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 927 (noting that "[s]uch a relationship provides evidence of the
alleged infringer's intent to trade on the plaintiff's goodwill").
121. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532 (stating that the benefit is the reputation or goodwill
of the plaintiff).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 895.
124. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532 (noting that both cards can be used at ATM's, at
selected retail stores, and to access selected insurance benefits); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505
(finding a "strong similarity" between Exxon's reputation of providing petroleum products and car
care services and defendant's automotive repair business). But see Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (not-
ing that even though both products are single lens reflex cameras, "their functional characteristics
are equally distinct").
125. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532.
126. Id. (noting that AT&T had spent "millions" on advertising).
127. Id. (noting that AT&T promoted their card directly to the public using various media
sources, whereas UMC markets directly to financial institutions who market the cards to account-
holders); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 506 (finding that even though Exxon's advertising was "na-
tional in nature, both parties aim at the Houston market" through identical advertising media).
128. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33 (pointing out that in order to obtain an AT&T
card, the customer must "reach out" and select AT&T as a provider, whereas account-holders at
the sponsoring financial institution could receive a UMC card.); cf Pignons, 657 F.2d at 488
(noting that plaintiff's cameras were sold through "exclusive distributorships" which sell to the
public, whereas defendant mass-marketed their cameras through camera stores, discount stores and
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marketing.
The district court focused upon the degree of care consumers would exer-
cise in selecting between providers of ATM cards.'29 However, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with UMC that consumers may exercise a higher degree of care
in choosing an ATM card, but the degree of care is low when they are actual-
ly using the card. 3 Thus, when analyzing this criterion, it is important to
determine when an actual purchase is being made in order to determine the
degree of care.
The Tenth Circuit approved of the application of a "strength of mark"
test. 3' The more similar the trademarks used on various goods, the less like-
ly the potential for confusion between specific products which incorporate the
"weak mark."'32 Factors for consideration include the length of time the par-
ty has used the mark'33 and how widely used the mark is by other active
parties.'34 Of significant importance is the concurrent use of similar trade-
marks by parties similarly engaged in selling the same product or service.'35
The court concluded that the term "Universal" was a "relatively weak mark"
and thus did not favor UMC.
36
Evidence to consider for actual confusion can be gleaned through surveys
which ask relevant questions and use technically adequate survey proce-
dures.'37 The court seemed to be favorably impressed by the "thorough mar-
ket research survey" which was conducted by "an expert in the field of mar-
keting research, consumer behavior and marketing and consumer communica-
tions., 131 On the other hand, the court was less influenced and even skeptical
of the meager evidence supplied by UMC.'39 Thus, the importance of actual
drug stores, etc.).
129. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (finding that moderate care would be exercised in the
selection of an ATM card).
130. Id. (noting that one does not make a "purchase" when selecting an ATM card). The court
noted that a purchase was made when the ATM card was being used. Id.
131. Id. (stating that the district court was proper in considering the strength of UMC's mark).
132. Id.
133. See id. (acknowledging that UMC has "used its mark for a substantial period of time");
see also Giant Food, 710 F.2d at 1569 (noting that the opposer had used the mark continuously
for more than 45 years); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 491 (noting that plaintiff had used the mark "Alpa"
for over 30 years). It is of interest to note that Giant Food lists three items to measure strength or
"fame" of the mark: volume of sales, advertising, and duration of use. Giant Food, 710 F.2d at
1569.
134. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (noting that over 200 active businesses use the
term "Universal"); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 504 (finding "that EXXON is a strong trademark
deserving wide protection" because no "other party besides Exxon Corporation uses EXXON").
135. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (pointing out that six financial institutions and
two credit card companies use the term "Universal" on their ATM or credit cards). But see Vic-
tory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 557 (N.D. I11. 1984) (noting that a
weak mark has limited protection applicable "only to similar goods similarly marketed" compared
to a strong mark which provides protection against dissimilar goods).
136. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533-34.
137. Id. at 1534 n.3 (noting that the expert was Dr. Thomas DuPont).
138. Id. at 1534 n.3 (finding that only 2.6% of the AT&T cardholders interviewed were actu-
ally confused by the "Universal" mark on both the AT&T card and UMC ATM's).
139. See id. at 1535 (stating that the court assumed that UMC's evidence constituted some
actual confusion, but this would be a "generous interpretation of the record"); see also Universal
Money, 797 F. Supp. at 896-97 (criticizing UMC for offering "little but allegations and denials"
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confusion should not be understated."4 Perhaps if UMC had given more
weight to this factor and performed their own "professional" survey, the out-
come of the case may have been different. 4'
While stating that none of the factors analyzed were "dispositive," the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that use of "Univer-





Although the Tenth Circuit claimed that no one factor in the likelihood of
confusion test was dispositive, 43 the court deferred to the "big guy" in the
dispute.'" Nevertheless, the court did shed light on several factors which
should be considered within the likelihood of confusion test. Specifically, the
strength of the mark should provide additional guidance for those engaged in
trademark clearance searches. A registered trademark that is "weak" is essen-
tially worthless 145 and should be avoided. Trademark infringement cases are
very fact-specific and absent a showing of "overt" infringement, it may be
difficult to determine whether one has a "safe" trademark. In fact, some com-
mentators have noted that "the entire system of trademark protection seems
questionable" given the subtests of the likelihood of confusion test and the
decisions interpreting them."4
Martha Munchhof
and finding the evidence unpersuasive "in light of the ample time UMC has had to obtain con-
sumer" survey results). But see Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1540 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting
sarcastically that "Although UMC's telephone survey may not have conformed to the level of
scientific methodology ascribed" to by Dr. DuPont, it nonetheless was entitled to some weight
since it opposed the validity of AT&T's survey).
140. See DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 175 (stating that "[elvidence of 'actual confusion'
may be vital in winning a trademark infringement case").
141. See id. (warning businesses that it would be "prudent" to watch for "actual confusion").
142. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1536.
143. Id.
144. The tone of the opinion seemed slanted towards AT&T. I mention this not to say that I
disagree with the holding of the case, but rather as a side-note. The court quoted AT&T's
trademark counsel's warning that the use of the term "Universal" was risky "because AT&T was
'particularly vulnerable to complaints of infringement because we are AT&T."' Id. at 1531-32.
This seems to suggest that the court also considered another factor: what economic status does the
alleged infringer have? Moreover, the court gave substantial weight to AT&T's "expert" who no
doubt was paid a hefty sum. See id. at 1535. However, this brings to light a disturbing thought:
What about the little guy who can't afford an expensive expert and comprehensive survey? Should
he lose out in a "close call" just because he had an inadequate survey showing actual proof of
confusion? I hope not.
145. I describe it as worthless because absent a finding of substantial similarity in appearance,
UMC could not enforce its trademark rights. The court acknowledged that the services provided
by the two competing cards were similar. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. With
this concession, it seems that a higher scrutiny should be afforded for the other factors in the test
since they are competing products.
146. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 174 (exclaiming "[w]ho would think to do a clearance
search on Cyclone when the mark is Tornado?").
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